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QUESTION PRESENTED 
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 
209 (1977), this Court confirmed that the Constitution 
permits States to adopt the model of collective 
bargaining that is widely used in the private sector 
pursuant to federal labor law. Under this model, a 
union that employees select to serve as their exclusive 
representative in collective-bargaining negotiations 
may charge all represented employees––including 
those who decline to join the union––an “agency fee” 
to defray the costs of the workplace services provided 
by the union. In reliance on Abood, twenty-three 
States and the District of Columbia have long 
authorized public-sector collective-bargaining arrange-
ments that include agency-fee provisions. 
Amici States address the following question raised 
by petitioners: 
Whether Abood should be overruled, thereby 
forcing many States to abandon the labor-
management arrangements that they have long 
used to ensure the efficient and uninterrupted 
provision of government services to the public? 
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 INTEREST OF THE AMICI STATES 
Every day, millions of state and local government 
employees across the country perform varied functions 
in the service of varied communities. There is no one-
size-fits-all approach for the government employers 
tasked with managing them. What works to attract 
and retain police officers in a small rural community 
is vastly different from what is required to attract and 
retain sanitation workers in a large urban area, or 
public school teachers in the suburbs.  
Accordingly, this Court has long recognized that 
States’ judgments about how best to manage their 
workforces warrant deference. See Abood v. Detroit 
Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Abood held 
in relevant part that States may permit collective-
bargaining arrangements under which state and local 
government employees who are represented by a 
union—including those employees who decline to 
become union members—may be charged an “agency 
fee” to cover the costs of the workplace services 
provided by the union. Id. at 221-22. In that context, 
the government is acting as an employer, and the 
Court has long recognized that the First Amendment 
permits government employers to adopt reasonable 
workforce-management policies to promote efficient 
and effective operation of the public sector workplace, 
see, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417-20 
(2006). 
This amicus brief is filed on behalf of the States of 
New York, Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Mexico, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Virginia, and Washington, and the District of 
13
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Columbia.1 Amici States employ a wide range of 
different approaches for managing their workforces, 
but all have a significant interest in preserving the 
flexibility to structure public-sector labor relations 
that Abood allows.  
As Abood recognized, the task of balancing the 
potentially divergent interests of public employers, 
public employees, and the public is delicate and diffi-
cult. And the stakes are high. In the decades before 
Abood, many States faced paralyzing public-sector 
strikes and labor unrest that jeopardized public order 
and safety. The relative success of state labor-relations 
systems in preserving public-sector labor peace should 
not be mistaken for evidence that the leeway afforded 
by Abood is no longer needed. To the contrary, that 
success is evidence that Abood works because it 
confirms that states and local governments have used 
the flexibility allowed by Abood to adopt policies best 
tailored to meet their needs in achieving labor peace. 
That flexibility is no less critical today than when 
Abood was decided. Now, as before, labor peace 
secures the uninterrupted function of government 
itself and is a necessary precondition for the secure 
and effective provision of government services. 
Amici States also have a substantial interest in 
avoiding the vast disruption in state and local labor 
relations that would occur if the Court were now to 
overrule Abood’s approval of public-sector collective-
bargaining arrangements utilizing agency-fee rules. 
That ruling is the foundation for thousands of contracts 
                                                                                          
1 The District of Columbia is not a State, but possesses a 
strong interest in this matter similar to those of the States. It is 
included in this brief’s references to “Amici States.” 
14
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 14 [2019], Art. 38
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/38
 3
involving millions of public employees in twenty-three 
States and the District of Columbia. 
Abood is permissive, not mandatory. Voters and 
elected officials in each State—including the States 
that support petitioner here—remain free to decide 
what policies should apply in public-sector labor 
relations for their communities. Petitioner and his 
amici should not be permitted to constrain those 
options by constitutionalizing a single approach to 
public-sector labor relations for all state and local 
governments nationwide. As this Court has 
recognized, the Constitution permits States “broad 
autonomy in structuring their governments” out of 
respect for the “‘integrity, dignity, and residual 
sovereignty of the States’” and to “‘secure[] to citizens 
the liberties that derive from diffusion of sovereign 
power.’” Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 
2623 (2013) (quoting Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 
211, 221 (2011)). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. This Court’s Longstanding Recognition 
That Private Employers May Require 
Employees to Fund the Workplace-
Related Activities of a Union Designated 
to Act as Their Exclusive Representative  
Labor-relations law in the United States has long 
been based on a model of exclusive representation 
accompanied by agency-fee authorization. The first 
federal law guaranteeing workers the right to 
organize was the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. 
§ 151 et seq. Enacted in 1926 after decades of labor 
unrest in the railroad industry, the RLA enabled 
railroad workers to select a union that would serve as 
15
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their exclusive representative in dealing with 
management, and imposed a corresponding duty of 
fair-representation on the union to represent all 
employees in good faith and without discrimination. 
See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Maintenance of Way 
Employees, 481 U.S. 429, 444 (1987); International 
Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750-60 
(1961). The RLA was later expanded to specifically 
authorize “union-shop” arrangements that required 
employees to join the union designated as their 
exclusive-bargaining representative and to pay an 
“agency fee,” as a condition of continued employment. 
See Ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (1951) (amending 45 
U.S.C. § 152). 
Congress adopted a similar model in enacting the 
much broader National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, the federal statute that 
comprehensively regulates labor relations for most 
employees in the private sector. As with the RLA, 
Congress sought to end labor strife and to reduce the 
need for labor strikes by encouraging collective 
bargaining. And Congress once again identified 
exclusive-representation collective bargaining as the 
best model for achieving labor peace. See First Nat’l 
Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1981). 
The NLRA also authorized “agency shop” agreements 
that permitted employees to choose not to join the 
union that represented them, but required all 
represented employees to pay fees to the union for the 
collective-bargaining assistance and other workplace-
related services that those employees received. See 
Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 
735, 738 & 744-45 (1988). 
In a series of decisions beginning with Railway 
Employees’ Department v. Hanson, this Court construed 
16
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the “union shop” and “agency shop” provisions of the 
RLA and NLRA as requiring only financial support for 
an employee-selected union, not compelled union 
membership by objecting employees. 351 U.S. 225, 238 
(1956). This Court also determined that compulsory 
fees must be limited to compensating the union for 
actual collective bargaining and related activities, and 
could not be used to fund unrelated political lobbying. 
With those limits in place, the Court rejected claims 
that the First Amendment prohibited government 
legislation authorizing unions to impose a mandatory 
financial obligation on represented employees who 
chose not to join the union, to defray the union’s costs 
for collective bargaining and other workplace-related 
activities germane to labor-management relations. 
See Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); 
Street, 367 U.S. at 749.   
B. This Court’s Determination in Abood That 
States May Adopt Labor-Management 
Policies Similar to Those That Have 
Proved Effective in the Private Sector  
In Abood, this Court recognized the important 
state interest in avoiding labor strife that could disrupt 
government operations and programs. The Court 
confirmed that States, acting as employers, should not 
be deprived of the ability to pursue labor peace and 
stability in the public workforce by adopting labor-
management policies—such as exclusive-representa-
tion collective-bargaining funded through agency-
fees—that federal law has long allowed private 
employers to utilize. See 431 U.S. at 229-33. 
Abood involved a First Amendment challenge to a 
Michigan statute that authorized collective bargain-
ing for local public school teachers under the same 
17
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exclusive-representation, agency-fee model authorized 
by federal law for the private sector. Id. at 212-14, 223-
24. This Court, in rejecting that challenge, noted that 
government entities have a strong interest in 
providing for exclusive representation in light of “[t]he 
confusion and conflict that could arise” if government 
employers had to reach multiple, potentially varying 
agreements with different unions. Id. at 224; see id. at 
220. And the Court further observed that the union’s 
“tasks of negotiating and administering a collective-
bargaining agreement . . . often entail expenditure of 
much time and money.” Id. at 221. The Court 
recognized that agency fees address the inherent “free 
rider” problem created by exclusive representation: 
that is, employees who are guaranteed union repre-
sentation may decline to share in the costs incurred by 
the union, creating the risk that unions will be under-
funded and unable to fulfill their intended duties. Id. 
at 221-22.    
Abood acknowledged that public-sector 
unionization was controversial as a policy matter and 
that there was widespread debate and disagreement 
about the utility of adopting private-sector models to 
manage public-sector workplaces. Id. at 224-25, 229. 
Partly for that reason, Abood deferred to state 
judgments about appropriate workforce policies to 
achieve stable public-sector labor relations. The Court 
noted that the “‘ingredients’” of labor peace and 
stability were too numerous, complex, and context-
dependent for judges to second-guess the wisdom of 
particular state choices. Id. at 225 n.20 (quoting 
Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233-34).  
Abood and multiple later cases establish that the 
First Amendment permits agency fees to be imposed 
on public employees who do not wish to join the union 
18
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designated as their exclusive representative, so long 
as objecting employees are not charged for political or 
ideological activities unrelated to the union’s workplace 
services. See, e.g., Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207, 213 
(2009); see also Knox v. Service Emps. Int’l Union, 567 
U.S. 298, 302 (2012). To be sure, the Court has conclu-
ded that a State’s desire to secure labor peace and 
prevent free-riding may not justify the imposition of 
an agency-fee requirement on persons who are not 
“full-fledged public employees.” Harris v. Quinn, 
134 S. Ct. 2618, 2638 (2014). But the Court has 
recognized that different considerations are implica-
ted when a State—acting in its capacity as an 
employer—devises rules for managing its own 
workers. Id. at 2634.  
C. Abood’s Centrality to Public-Sector 
Workforce Management 
Abood’s framework is now central to state labor 
law. See Appendix, Survey of State Statutory 
Authority for Public-Sector Collective Bargaining by 
Exclusive Representative. Forty-one States, the 
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico authorize collec-
tive bargaining for at least some public employees, 
and all adopt the federal model of exclusive represen-
tation.2 Twenty-three States and the District of 
Columbia also authorize agency fees (also known as 
                                                                                          
2 These States are Alaska, Arkansas, California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, 
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, South Dakota, Utah, 
Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See Appendix.  
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“fair share” fees) to provide a mechanism for ensuring 
that represented employees contribute to the costs of 
workplace-related services that their exclusive repre-
sentative provides. The majority of these statutes 
make agency-fee requirements a permissible subject 
of bargaining and authorize (but do not require) 
agency-fee provisions as part of public-sector collective- 
bargaining agreements.3 Many state agency-fee 
statutes were enacted in specific reliance on Abood.4 
D. Petitioner’s Challenge 
Illinois law permits public employees to select a 
union to act as their exclusive representative and 
authorizes the union to negotiate the inclusion of an 
agency-fee provision—called a “fair share” clause—in 
its collective-bargaining agreement to cover “the costs 
of the collective bargaining process, contract adminis-
tration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours 
and conditions of employment.” 5 Ill. Comp. Stat. 
315/6(e); see also id. § 315/6(c). Petitioner Mark Janus 
is employed by the State of Illinois in a bargaining unit 
that is exclusively represented by Respondent AFSCME 
                                                                                          
3 These States are Alaska, California (for local and state 
employees), Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, 
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington, 
and the District of Columbia. See Appendix. 
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Div. of Budget, Budget Report for S. 6835, at 
3, reprinted in Bill Jacket for ch. 677 (1977) (discussing Abood); 
see also Sally Whiteside, Robert Vogt, & Sherryl Scott, Illinois 
Public Labor Relations Laws: A Commentary and Analysis, 60 
Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 883, 924 & n.264 (1984) (Illinois Public Labor 
Relations Act was drafted by the Illinois Legislature to comport 
with Abood). 
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Council 31; the collective bargaining agreement 
covering his employment contains a fair-share clause 
to help the union defray its costs of collective 
bargaining and other workplace services. (Joint App’x 
(“J.A.”) 68, 124.) Petitioner is not a member of the 
union and objects to paying his fair-share fee because 
he disagrees with the union’s “one-sided politicking for 
only its point of view” and believes the union fails to 
“appreciate the current fiscal crises in Illinois and 
does not reflect his best interests or the interests of 
Illinois citizens.” (J.A. 87.)  
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the 1960s and 1970s, many States experienced 
devastating public-sector work stoppages that 
disrupted the delivery of critical government services. 
In the wake of those disruptions, States reconsidered 
how best to manage their public workforces to avoid 
labor unrest. Many States adopted laws permitting 
public employees to elect an exclusive representative; 
some States also adopted laws permitting agency-fee 
arrangements to ensure adequate funding for the 
exclusive representative.  
Abood permitted States flexibility to make these 
judgments, and that flexibility should be preserved. 
As Amici States’ experiences have shown, there is no 
one-size-fits-all approach to managing the millions of 
state and local public employees across the country. 
For some public employers, the services of an exclusive 
representative funded by agency fees may be unneces-
sary. For others, those services and the agency fees 
that support them may be critically important to 
ensure the delivery of core government services. 
Jurisdictions can disagree about how best to achieve 
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labor peace, and this Court should continue to respect 
those judgments as it did in Abood. 
ARGUMENT  
THE STATES HAVE A SIGNIFICANT AND 
VALID INTEREST IN PRESERVING ABOOD 
Abood recognized that States have a significant 
and valid interest in being able to employ the models 
of collective bargaining that have proved successful for 
avoiding strikes in the private sector. And Abood 
deferred to the judgments of States that have chosen 
to permit use of the core elements of private-sector 
collective bargaining––exclusive representation and 
agency fees––to manage labor relations with state and 
local government employees.  
In the decades since Abood, States have relied 
substantially on that decision when crafting their 
public-sector labor-management systems. Petitioner’s 
attack on Abood and its approval of public-sector 
agency-fee rules threatens the labor-relations systems 
of twenty-three States and the District of Columbia.5   
Principles of stare decisis have special force where 
States have relied on this Court’s precedent in 
structuring their laws, because the resulting statutes 
would be invalidated if the Court’s precedent is 
overruled or altered. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 
952, 985-86 (1996) (plurality op.); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. 
Director, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768, 785-86 (1992); 
Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 
197, 202-03 (1991). Here, the Abood rule is deeply 
                                                                                          
5 See supra n.2, and accompanying Appendix. 
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entrenched, and is the foundation for thousands of 
contracts involving millions of public employees across 
the Nation. Even in constitutional cases, the doctrine 
of stare decisis carries such persuasive weight that 
this Court has “always required . . . special justifica-
tion” for overruling settled precedent. See, e.g., United 
States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 517 U.S. 
843, 856 (1996) (quotation marks omitted). 
Petitioner identifies no special justification for 
overruling Abood. Rather, he bases his call to revisit 
Abood on decisions declining to extend Abood’s 
reasoning to new and different contexts. For example, 
petitioner relies substantially on Knox v. Service 
Employees International Union, which holds that the 
First Amendment prohibits a union from charging the 
non-members it represents in collective bargaining a 
“special assessment or dues increase that is levied to 
meet expenses that were not disclosed when the 
amount of the regular assessment was set.” 567 U.S. 
at 303; see also id. at 318, 322. Petitioner also relies 
heavily on Harris v. Quinn, which holds that Abood’s 
rationale does not apply where the government seeks 
to impose an agency-fee requirement on persons who 
are not “full-fledged public employees,” 134 S. Ct. at 
2638. Neither of those decisions addresses the 
different considerations that are implicated when a 
State—in its capacity as an employer—devises 
collective-bargaining rules for its own employees. See 
Id. at 2634; Knox, 567 U.S. at 311-12. 
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I. Agency Fees Are Important to Maintaining 
the Labor-Management Model That Many 
States Rely on to Ensure the Effective and 
Efficient Provision of Services to the Public.  
After confronting devastating public-sector work 
stoppages that caused disruptions in critical govern-
ment services, many States decided to authorize 
public-sector employees to select an exclusive union 
representative, recognizing—as private-sector employ-
ers had long understood—that such a representative 
could provide services in the workplace that would 
minimize labor unrest. Many States also decided to 
permit agency-fee arrangements to fund those services, 
having determined that a secure funding source was 
important to ensure the union’s ability to provide the 
full range of contemplated workplace services. Even 
some States that do not generally permit agency-fee 
arrangements for public-sector unions—including 
Michigan, which supports petitioner here—have made 
exceptions for police and firefighter unions in recogni-
tion of the especially destructive nature of labor unrest 
in those fields. These state experiences confirm that 
exclusive representation supported by agency fees can 
be an indispensable tool to protect the public from 
harmful disruptions to government services and 
programs, and foster efficiency in government 
workplaces.  
A. State Laws Authorizing Public-Sector 
Collective Bargaining Were Adopted in 
Response to Devastating Strikes and 
Labor Unrest by State and Local 
Government Employees. 
Public-sector collective-bargaining laws were 
enacted to protect the public from the harmful effects 
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of public-sector work stoppages and other disruptions 
in government operations. See David Lewin et al., 
Getting it Right: Empirical Evidence and Policy 
Implications from Research on Public-Sector Unionism 
and Collective Bargaining 13 (Mar. 16, 2011). 
Although strikes and other work disruptions by public 
workers are now rare, they were common at the time 
that the majority of States first adopted public-sector 
collective-bargaining laws. See, e.g., David Ziskind, 
One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees 187 
(1940) (documenting 1,116 strikes by employees in all 
sectors of government service through 1940). Much of 
the labor unrest occurred because state and local 
workers wanted “a greater voice” in determining the 
terms of their employment, and lacked other means to 
air grievances and settle disputes with management. 
See N.Y. Governor’s Comm. on Pub. Emp. Relations, 
Final Report 42, 55 (1966). States thus realized “that 
protection of the public from strikes in the public 
services requires the designation of other ways and 
means for dealing with claims of public employees for 
equitable treatment.” Id. at 9.6   
Between 1965 and 1970, for example, there were 
over 1,400 separate work-stoppages by state and local 
public workers, involving well over a quarter million 
employees. See Richard Kearney, Labor Relations in 
the Public Sector 226-27 (3d ed. 2001); see also Morris 
                                                                                          
6 See also Pa. Governor’s Comm’n to Revise the Pub. Emp. 
Law, Report and Recommendations 6 (1968) (concluding that the 
“inability” of public employees to “bargain collectively has . . . led 
to more friction and strikes than any other single cause”); 5 Ill. 
Comp. Stat. 315/2 (declaring aim to establish “an alternate, 
expeditious, equitable and effective procedure for the resolution 
of labor disputes subject to approval procedures mandated by this 
Act”). 
25
et al.: Panel: Progressive State Responses to Janus
Published by The Keep, 2019
 14
Horowitz, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector 
115 (1994). In the 1960s, “strikes by public employees” 
in New York alone were “too numerous to recall or 
record”; they included “strikes by transit workers, fire-
men, sanitation employees, teachers, ferry workers, 
[and] on other occasions, social workers, practical 
nurses, city-employed lifeguards, doctors and public 
health nurses, etc.” DiMaggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 
283, 289 (1967).   
Walkouts and other work stoppages occurred 
despite state laws that directly prohibited public 
employees from striking or punished them for doing 
so. See, e.g., Association of Surrogates & Sup. Ct. 
Reporters v. State, 78 N.Y.2d 143, 152-53 (1991) 
(recounting New York’s historical experience). The 
States found that direct prohibitions on strikes were 
ineffective and difficult to enforce, and failed to address 
the root causes of labor unrest. And it quickly became 
clear that labor unrest in the public sector had the 
potential to inflict vast public harm and disruption. 
- In Baltimore, a 1974 strike by police officers, jail 
guards, and other municipal workers resulted 
in widespread “looting, shooting, and rock-
throwing,” and “fires ran 150 percent above 
normal.” See Md. Dep’t of Labor, Licensing & 
Regulation, Collective Bargaining for Maryland 
Public Employees: A Review of Policy Issues and 
Options 5 (1996) (recounting 1974 strike). State 
troopers had to patrol the streets to keep the 
peace. See Ben Franklin, Troopers Patrol 
Baltimore to Bar Renewed Unrest, N.Y. Times, 
July 13, 1974, at 1. 
- In 1968, a series of public-school teacher 
walkouts in New York City resulted in more 
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than one million children being deprived of 
education for thirty-six school days. Parents 
had to physically occupy public schools to keep 
the schools open. Many children were denied 
key services provided through public schools. 
For example, while the city typically provided 
400,000 free daily lunches to schoolchildren, 
only 160,000 were provided during the teacher 
strikes. See Strike’s Bitter End, Time, Nov. 29, 
1968, at 97. 
- Between 1940 and 1980, strikes by public 
transport workers in Cleveland, Philadelphia, 
Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York 
City caused vast disruptions. See Atlanta Buses 
Running Again, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1950, at 
50 (Atlanta’s transit strike); Bus Strike Imperils 
Chicago’s Transit, N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1968, at 
25 (Chicago strike); Strike Halts Most Public 
Transit Runs in Philadelphia, N.Y. Times, Mar. 
26, 1977, at 8 (Philadelphia strike); Transit 
Workers Strike Los Angeles Area Bus System, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 27, 1979, at A15 (Los Angeles 
and Cleveland strikes). In 1966, private 
businesses suffered over $100 million in losses 
daily during a twelve-day transit strike in New 
York City. See Transit Strike, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
5, 1966, at 33. Moreover, because people could 
not travel to hospitals to donate blood, the city’s 
blood supply fell to a twenty-year low, causing 
the postponement of nonemergency surgeries. 
Id. 
- During this same period, multiple strikes by 
sanitation workers caused uncollected trash to 
pile up on city streets, threatening a serious 
public-health emergency in many cities. See, 
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e.g., Fragrant Days in Fun City, Time, Feb. 16, 
1968, at 33; see also Joseph Sullivan, Mediators 
Seek to Settle Newark Sanitation Strike, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 29, 1976, at 55 (discussing strike in 
Newark, N.J.); Ziskind, supra, at 91-94 (recount-
ing strikes by sanitation workers across the 
country). 
- In 1965, a strike by 8000 welfare workers in 
New York City forced two-thirds of the city’s 
welfare centers to close for twenty-eight days 
and led to the interruption of services to more 
than 500,000 welfare recipients, many of whom 
were children or elderly. See Joshua Freeman, 
Working-Class New York: Life and Labor Since 
World War II 205-06 (2001); see also Emanuel 
Perlmutter, Welfare Strike Due in City Today 
Inspite of Writ, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1965, at 1.  
- Strikes by workers at state mental hospitals 
also interrupted critical care for patients with 
mental illness. In 1968, a strike by mental-
health workers at four state-run hospitals in 
New York forced patients to be sent home and 
led to a reduction in psychiatric treatment and 
rehabilitation services. See Ronald Donovan, 
Administering the Taylor Law 89-90 (1990); 
Damon Stetson, Fourth Hospital Moves 
Patients, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1968, at 1. Care 
was likewise interrupted in Ohio in 1974 when 
half of the workers at the State’s mental 
hospitals went on strike. See Louise Cooke, 
Workers’ Unrest Interrupts Municipal Service, 
St. Petersburg Times, July 15, 1974, at 4-A. 
As these examples illustrate, the harm of 
unresolved public-sector labor disputes can be 
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catastrophic. Public services such as police and fire 
protection, sanitation, and public-health tend to be 
provided uniquely by state and local governments, and 
the absence of those services threatens serious 
irreparable harm to the public. See National League of 
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976), overruled on 
other grounds, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit 
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Even where private substi-
tutes exist, state and local programs are often made 
available at no cost (such as public education) or are 
heavily subsidized (such as public transportation). As 
a result, disruption of these services especially 
threatens the most vulnerable citizens—low-income 
persons or those who have a special need for 
government support. The harms of public-sector labor 
breakdowns are thus difficult to predict or to control, 
and even short-term disruptions in particular services 
can have vast social and economic spillover effects. 
B. In Responding to These Crises, States 
Looked to the Labor-Management Model 
That Had Already Proven Effective in the 
Private Sector under Federal Labor Law. 
In the wake of these work stoppages, States sought 
to implement workforce-management strategies that 
would minimize the potential for interruption of 
government services.7 See, e.g., N.Y. Governor’s 
                                                                                          
7 See, e.g., Del. Code tit. 19, § 1301 (collective-bargaining 
system for public employees is designed “to protect the public by 
assuring the orderly and uninterrupted operations and 
functions” of government); Fla. Stat. § 447.201 (same); Iowa Code 
§ 20.1 (same); Kansas Stat. § 75-4321(3) (same); Neb. Revised 
Stat. §§ 48-802, 81-1370 (same); N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 200 
(same); Or. Rev. Stat. § 243.656(3) (permitting collective 
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Comm., supra, at 9, 42. In undertaking this task, 
States understandably sought guidance in solutions 
that had already proven effective in minimizing labor 
unrest in the private sector—that is, by permitting 
employees to select an exclusive representative to deal 
with management.8 In fact, nearly every State has 
adopted the exclusive-representation model that 
Congress permitted for private employees. See 
Appendix. Many States did so only after careful study 
by expert commissions charged with examining the 
underlying reasons for public-sector labor unrest and 
devising appropriate solutions.9 
                                                                                          
bargaining safeguards “the public from injury, impairment and 
interruptions of necessary services, and removes certain recog-
nized sources of strife and unrest”); Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 3, § 901 
(state employees’ labor relations act aims “to protect the rights of 
the public in connection with labor disputes”). 
8 See, e.g., Harry Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in 
the Public Sector, 71 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 932 (1973) (noting 
“accelerating” trend among States towards using “private sector 
principles to guide the development of labor relations in the 
public sector”); Russell Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports 
on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A Comparative 
Analysis, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 891, 897, 899, 901, 904 (1969) (noting 
that various state commissions relied on NLRA and other 
private-sector models in offering recommendations for public-
sector labor relations policy in the State). 
9 See, e.g., Milton Derber, Labor-Management Policy for 
Public Employees in Illinois: The Experience of the Governor’s 
Commission, 1966-1967, 21 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 541, 549 
(1968); see also Conn. Interim Comm’n to Study Collective 
Bargaining by Municipalities, Final Report 7-8 (1965); Md. Dep’t 
of Labor, supra, at 3-6; Mass. Legis. Research Council, Report 
Relative to Collective Bargaining and Local Government 
Employees 8-11 (1969); Mich. Advisory Comm. Pub. Emp. 
Relations, Report to Governor (1967), reprinted in Gov’t Emp. 
Relations Report, No. 181 (Feb. 28, 1967); N.J. Pub. & Sch. 
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1. An exclusive representative can 
provide services in the workplace 
that reduce labor unrest and yield 
other benefits for employers. 
As in the private sector, exclusive representation 
can advance a public employer’s interest in maintain-
ing workforce stability by providing services to 
workers that minimize labor unrest. One such service, 
of course, is collective bargaining. Giving workers a 
voice in the agreement that will govern the terms and 
conditions of their employment reduces the likelihood 
that they will resort to strikes and work stoppages to 
achieve their demands.10 Another such service is 
“grievance adjustment.” See Abood, 431 U.S. at 225-
26. Grievance systems vary among workplaces, but 
the exclusive representative’s central role in 
administering those systems does not. The union’s 
involvement begins before any grievance is filed, by 
communicating directly with workers about their 
concerns in the workplace. The union-trained shop 
steward, who typically fills this role, thus “plays a 
vital role in effecting peaceful union-management 
relations” by serving as “a front-line troubleshooter.” 
                                                                                          
Emps.’ Grievance Procedure Study Comm’n, Final Report 6, 15-
17 (1968); N.Y. Governor’s Comm., supra, at 34-35, 41-42; Pa. 
Governor’s Comm., supra, at ii, 1.  
10 See, e.g., Janet Currie & Sheena McConnell, The Impact 
of Collective-Bargaining Legislation on Disputes in the U.S. 
Public Sector: No Legislation May Be the Worst Legislation, 37 
J.L. & Econ. 519, 530 (1994) (finding strike incidence highest 
where parties have “neither a duty to bargain nor dispute-
resolution procedures”); Richard Freeman & James Medoff, What 
Do Unions Do?, at 7-10 (1984) (articulating “voice” function of 
union representation). 
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Carlton Snow & Elliot Abramson, The Dual Role of the 
Union Steward: A Problem in Labor-Management 
Relations, 33 Syracuse L. Rev. 795, 795 (1982). The 
steward investigates worker complaints, organizes 
and documents them, and then initially presents 
worker grievances to management. See AFSCME, 
Steward Handbook 21-39 (2013).11 The union also 
typically provides representation throughout the 
grievance process. Professional union staff appear 
with the worker for meetings with management and 
prepare written submissions and oral presentation on 
the worker’s behalf. If the dispute proceeds to formal 
arbitration or judicial proceedings, the union represen-
tative provides services similar to those that an 
attorney would provide in traditional civil litigation.  
Union participation in the grievance process is an 
obvious benefit to workers. It increases the likelihood 
of a positive outcome, relieves the worker of a signifi-
cant financial burden, and provides support through 
what can be a stressful experience.  
But States’ experiences show that a union’s 
participation in grievance adjustment is also a signifi-
cant benefit for employers. The existence of an 
advocate for workers who is independent of manage-
ment means that workers are likely to communicate 
their concerns more freely, which advances organiza-
tional efficiency by reducing employee turnover and 
                                                                                          
11 See also Paul Clark, The Role of the Steward in Shaping 
Union Member Attitudes toward the Grievance Procedure, 13 Lab. 
Stud. J. 3, 3-6 (Fall 1988); Glenn Miller & Ned Rosen, Members’ 
Attitudes Toward the Shop Steward, 10 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 
516, 517 (1957) (noting steward’s responsibility to “convey 
information to the members” and to convey “to the officers the 
attitudes and point of view of members”).  
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promoting workplace productivity. See Freeman & 
Medoff, supra, at 103-07, 169; see also E. Edward 
Herman, Collective Bargaining and Labor Relations 
283-86 (3d ed. 1992). Employers benefit from facing a 
single advocate, whose experience with the workplace 
and institutional knowledge of the collective-
bargaining agreement help facilitate timely and 
satisfactory dispute resolution. And by serving as the 
gatekeeper for worker disputes, a union alleviates the 
administrative burden of organizing, prioritizing, and 
raising issues in the workplace that would otherwise 
fall to the employer.  
In addition to its role in the grievance process, an 
exclusive representative provides important services 
to workers and employers alike through its day-to-day 
administration of the collective-bargaining agreement. 
This may sometimes occur through formal means, 
such as by participating in joint labor-management 
committees formed under the auspices of a collective-
bargaining agreement. (E.g., J.A. 143-144.) In the 
experience of many States, such committees are an 
important and effective tool for improving public 
services. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Labor Task Force on 
Excellence in State and Local Government through 
Labor-Management Cooperation, Working Together 
for Public Service: Final Report, i, 2 (1996) (“Task 
Force Report”).12 For instance, in Connecticut, a labor-
management committee created a workplace safety 
                                                                                          
12 See also E. Edward Herman, Collective Bargaining and 
Labor Relations 311-12 (2d ed. 1987); Freeman & Medoff, supra, 
at 169; Minnesota State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 
271, 291-92 (1983) (recognizing state’s “legitimate interest” in 
system of exclusive representation because it ensures that 
decisions by public employers will be based on “majority view” of 
its employees). 
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program that reduced workers’ compensation expenses 
by five-million dollars through a forty-percent 
reduction in workplace injuries. Id. at 15. In Seattle, 
municipal government officials and a union of public-
employee sewer workers worked collaboratively to 
identify a number of significant cost savings in the 
maintenance and repair of the City’s underground 
transit tunnel, allowing the city to achieve concrete 
cost savings while also improving the quality of its 
transportation infrastructure. Id. at 19-20. And in 
New York City, local government and the sanitation 
workers’ union negotiated to reduce the number of 
sanitation workers operating a sanitation truck, 
permitting the city to lower its labor costs by adopting 
cost-saving technologies. Lewin, supra, at 17. Indeed, 
particularly when faced with a looming economic 
crisis, government and unions have worked together 
to develop solutions that are mutually beneficial and 
ensure the continued provision of indispensable 
government services.  
Administering the collective-bargaining agreement 
also involves a full range of informal services that the 
union provides in the workplace every day. These 
services include core human-resource functions like: 
(i) advising employees about their pay, benefits, or 
other contract rights, through published union 
bulletins and in in-person meetings; (ii) communi-
cating with management to resolve errors in the 
processing of employee benefits, such as incorrect 
payroll deductions, leave accruals, or medical benefits 
reimbursements; (iii) reviewing management’s day-to-
day personnel decisions, such as setting shift schedules 
and granting leave requests, for compliance with the 
collective-bargaining agreement; and (iv) coordinating 
workplace inspections and worker health and safety 
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trainings mandated by law or the collective-
bargaining agreement. The union’s informal support 
of workers in the workplace plays an important role in 
improving their day-to-day experience and reducing 
the possibility that daily resentments will metastasize 
into full-scale labor unrest.  
2. Many States have determined that 
agency fees help them secure the full 
benefits of exclusive representation. 
In sum, an exclusive representative provides a 
wealth of services beyond contract bargaining, and a 
public employer could rationally conclude that those 
services can be an important ingredient in minimizing 
labor unrest and assuring a stable and effective public 
workforce. To ensure that an exclusive representative 
is able to provide its services in the workplace, many 
States’ laws permit public employers—state or local—
to include agency-fee arrangements in their collective-
bargaining agreements. See Appendix. These laws 
typically do not require any public employee to pay an 
agency fee, or require any public employer to include 
an agency-fee arrangement in its contracts. Rather, 
States that have enacted such measures have decided 
to give government employers the flexibility to make 
that choice based on their own circumstances.  
As those States have recognized, agency fees can 
be important to developing a collaborative labor-
management relationship that promotes labor peace 
and ensures the delivery of high-quality services. 
First, agency fees are an effective way to address the 
free-rider problem long recognized to exist in this 
context. See, e.g., Street, 367 U.S. at 765-66. 
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 A union needs significant resources to provide the 
full range of workplace services that States deem 
helpful for minimizing labor unrest. See Abood, 431 
U.S. at 221 (recognizing that unions require “[t]he 
services of lawyers, expert negotiators, economists, 
and a research staff” to negotiate and administer a 
collective-bargaining agreement). But experience shows 
that many employees—even employees who would 
otherwise join the union—will choose not to pay for 
such services if they have the option to receive them 
without charge.13 This free-rider problem is 
particularly acute for governments with a history of 
labor unrest, as it erodes the union’s ability to provide 
the very services that government deems important to 
securing labor peace. State experiences show that a 
well-funded union is a more stable advocate for 
workers and that dealing with such a partner “lead[s] 
to greater labor peace and stability.” Md. Dep’t of 
Labor, supra, at 19.  
Second, free-riding may itself create labor unrest, 
in light of the “resentment spawned by ‘free riders.’” 
Beck, 487 U.S. at 750. Without agency fees, union 
members would be required to pay more in union 
dues—and take home less pay than their colleagues—
to subsidize the cost of providing workplace services to 
non-members. Such inequities create divisions in the 
workplace that corrode cohesion and morale. See Ellis 
v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 452 (1984). Agency 
fees eliminate this problem by ensuring that no 
                                                                                          
13 See Richard Kearney & Patrice Mareschal, Labor Relations 
in the Public Sector 79 (5th ed. 2014); see also Jeffrey Keefe, On 
Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association: The Inextricable 
Links Between Exclusive Representation, Agency Fees, and the 
Duty of Fair Representation 4 (Econ. Pol’y Inst. Briefing Paper 
No. 411, 2015). 
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employees receive “the benefits of union representa-
tion without paying for them.” Oil Workers v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 416 (1976).  
Furthermore, agency fees address the problems of 
free-riding with only minimal impact on workers’ 
rights of expression and association. Agency-fee 
arrangements do not require any worker to join a 
union or donate to a union’s political or ideological 
activities. Nor do they restrict an employee’s speech in 
any way. An employee remains free to speak against a 
union’s political agenda or negotiating positions, and 
to oppose the government officials responsible for 
negotiating the union’s contract. Agency fees merely 
require an employee to pay for services rendered. 
Thus, in practice, Amici States’ experience is that the 
“grievous First Amendment injury,” Pet. Br. 12, of 
which petitioner warns is not a valid practical concern.  
Petitioner argues that an exclusive representative 
does not need mandatory agency fees to function 
because it can generate sufficient operating funds 
through other means. See Pet. Br. 37-43. The evidence 
is to the contrary. See supra n.13. In any event, this 
argument fails to recognize that—based on their 
different experiences—jurisdictions can reasonably 
disagree about an exclusive representative’s proper 
role in the workplace and the appropriate method to 
fund those activities.  
For example, federal law permits federal public-
sector workers to elect a union to serve as their 
exclusive representative without any attendant 
requirement that workers join or financially support 
the union, but that law also severely restricts the 
scope of issues that can be collectively bargained, and 
exempts key topics that would be covered by broader 
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state collective-bargaining regimes, such as wages and 
number of employees. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1); see 
also Navy Charleston Naval Shipyard v. Federal 
Labor Relations Auth., 885 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 
1989). Having prescribed a restricted role, a juris-
diction could rationally conclude—as does the federal 
government—that agency fees are not necessary to 
guarantee the exclusive representative’s proper 
functioning. This is especially true because the federal 
government funds union activities through alternate 
means, for instance by compensating federal employees 
for time spent performing union-related functions. See 
5 U.S.C. § 7131; see also U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 
Official Time Usage in the Federal Government, Fiscal 
Year 2014, at 3 (2017). 
Likewise, many jurisdictions with so-called “right-
to-work” laws—that is, laws permitting exclusive 
representation but prohibiting mandatory agency 
fees—lack the history of labor unrest and disruption 
to government services that many States experienced 
before Abood. See Kearney, supra, at 65. A jurisdiction 
that has not experienced a history of public-sector 
labor unrest could rationally decide not to fund an 
exclusive representative’s services through mandatory 
agency fees. But that policy choice does not refute the 
benefits of different policy choices that other 
jurisdictions have made based on their own different 
experiences. Even jurisdictions that do not authorize 
agency fees for most public-sector workers recognize 
that a different policy might be appropriate in certain 
circumstances. For instance, Michigan and Wisconsin 
prohibit agency fees for some public unions but 
exempt local police and firefighter unions from that 
prohibition as a matter of public safety. See Mich. 
Comp. Laws § 423.210(3)-(4); Wis. Stat. §§ 111.81(9), 
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111.845, 111.85; see also Mark Niquette, Walker’s Bill 
Gives Wisconsin Police a Pass on Pension Payments, 
Bloomberg (Feb. 25, 2011) (noting Wisconsin gover-
nor’s comment, in enacting the exemption for public 
safety employees, that “there’s no way we’re going to 
put the public safety at risk”). Thus even the practices 
of petitioner’s own amici call into question petitioner’s 
proposed one-size-fits-all approach.  
Abood confirmed that States should have the 
leeway to adopt the labor-relations systems best 
suited to their individual circumstances and policy 
judgments. And States have relied on that flexibility. 
States have enacted more than one hundred statutes 
governing state and local labor relations, augmented 
by local ordinances, court decisions, attorney general 
opinions, and executive orders. See Kearney & 
Mareschal, supra, at 64-66. 
Petitioner attempts to deprive States, and 
ultimately voters, of the ability to judge for themselves 
what labor-management policies are best suited for 
their public workforces. States like Illinois authorize 
agency-fee arrangements because a majority of duly 
elected representatives determined that affording 
government employers that flexibility was sound 
policy. Indeed, legislatures in Michigan and 
Wisconsin—two of petitioner’s amici—also decided 
that, in some situations, public employers must have 
the ability to include agency-fee arrangements in their 
collective-bargaining agreements. This Court should 
view skeptically the efforts of these States and of 
petitioner himself to subvert the democratic decisions 
of voters by seeking to constitutionalize a contrary 
policy of their own preference.  
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C. Petitioners’ Amici Misrepresent the Role 
of Public-Sector Collective Bargaining in 
Municipal Bankruptcies. 
The States supporting petitioner attempt to justify 
a constitutional ban on agency fees by claiming that 
public-sector collective bargaining creates heightened 
risks of municipal bankruptcy. Br. of Amici Curiae 
States of Michigan, et al. in Support of Pet. (“Pet. 
States Amici”) 11-19. There is, however, no clear 
correlation between collective bargaining and a 
municipality’s fiscal health.  
First, the vast majority of municipalities across 
the country have permitted collective bargaining for 
public-sector employees since the mid-1970s, see 
Kearney & Mareschal, supra, at 64-66, but only a very 
small percentage of municipalities—two-hundred-
and-sixty-four in total—have filed for bankruptcy 
after that time, see Chapman & Cutler, LLP, Primer 
on Municipal Debt Adjustment—Chapter 9: The Last 
Resort for Financially Distressed Municipalities, app. 
C-1 (2012) (municipal bankruptcies between 1980 and 
2012). And a number of those bankruptcies occurred 
in States that do not permit collective bargaining by 
state and local government employees or severely 
restrict it. Texas, for example, ranks third among all 
States in municipal bankruptcies but does not permit 
public-sector collective bargaining except by police or 
firefighters. See id. at app. C-2; see also Kearney & 
Mareschal, supra, at 66. There is thus nothing to 
support amici’s speculation that it is collectively 
bargained public-sector employee benefits that drive 
municipal bankruptcies.  
Second, municipal bankruptcies occur as a result 
of a complex mix of factors, often unique to each 
40
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locality’s particular history and circumstances, and 
cannot be explained simply as the product of high 
public-sector labor costs. Indeed, it is traditionally a 
decrease in revenues that causes a municipality to 
seek bankruptcy protection. The bankruptcy of 
Detroit, for instance, is typically attributed to a 
myriad of factors that depressed municipal tax 
receipts, such as declining population, poor economic 
performance, and reductions in state financial 
support. See, e.g., Wallace Turbeville, The Detroit 
Bankruptcy 13-21, 33-34 (Dēmos Rep. 2013). And a 
similar story is true in Stockton and San Bernadino, 
California, whose financial distress and ultimate 
bankruptcies were driven largely by a unique 
vulnerability to the “double whammy of unbridled 
speculation, followed by steep losses of property value” 
as a result of the 2008 recession. Tracy Gordon et al., 
Exuberance & Municipal Bankruptcy: A Case Study of 
San Bernardino, Stockton & Vallejo, CA 15-16 
(Goldman Sch. Pub. Pol’y Working Paper Series May 
2017 draft).14 Amici’s simplistic narrative gloss that 
high public-sector labor costs cause municipal 
bankruptcies thus fails to grapple with—and indeed 
purposely obscures—the diverse causative factors that 
produced these complicated fiscal incidents.  
Amici’s reliance on the purported “public impact” 
of the cost of public-employee pension plans is also 
misplaced. See, e.g., Pet. States Amici 13. All States—
regardless of whether they authorize collective 
                                                                                          
14 See also Sydney Evans et al., How Stockton Went Bust: A 
California City’s Decade of Policies and the Financial Crisis That 
Followed 2 (Cal. Common Sense. Rep. June 2012); The Pew 
Charitable Trusts, The State Role in Local Government Financial 
Distress 9-11 (July 2013). 
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bargaining in the public sector—establish the terms 
and conditions of their public-employee benefit plans 
by statute. It is the legislature, and not unions, that 
sets the scope of public-employee pension benefits.     
II. Petitioner’s Constitutional Challenge 
Should Be Rejected.  
Petitioner’s attempt to avoid paying his fair share 
for the services of his exclusive representative is 
grounded in two mischaracterizations of the nature 
and effect of agency fees. First, petitioner obscures the 
fact that agency-fee requirements are conditions of 
public employment that advance the government’s 
interest in managing its workforce. Second, petitioner 
confuses his objection to funding his exclusive repre-
sentative’s collective-bargaining activities with a 
broader challenge to all of the services that an 
exclusive representative provides.  
A. The First Amendment Affords Public 
Employers Flexibility to Manage Their 
Workforces.  
Petitioner’s First Amendment challenge rests 
centrally on the premise that government may not 
require a person to support speech absent a 
compelling interest that is furthered by the narrowest 
means possible. See Pet. Br. 36. But this characteri-
zation obscures the fact that agency-fee arrangements 
are negotiated by the government acting as an 
employer to manage its public workforce. Contrary to 
petitioner’s contention, such a condition of 
employment is not subject to “strict” or “exacting” 
scrutiny under the First Amendment.  
This Court has long recognized that the First 
Amendment permits States to adopt reasonable 
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workforce-management policies to promote effective 
government operations, even if those policies impact a 
public employee’s First Amendment rights. See, e.g., 
Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 598-
600 (2008); Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417-20; Waters v. 
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-75 (1994) (plurality op.). 
As this Court has explained, the Constitution allows 
the government flexibility to fulfill its “‘mission as 
employer,’” Engquist, 553 U.S. at 598 (quoting Waters, 
511 U.S. at 674-75), and does not require that a govern-
ment’s employment-related measures be “narrowly 
tailored to a compelling government interest,” Waters, 
511 U.S. at 674-75; see also National Aeronautics & 
Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 153-55 (2011).   
“[T]here is a crucial difference, with respect to 
constitutional analysis, between the government 
exercising the power to regulate” and the government 
acting “to manage its internal operation[s].” Engquist, 
553 U.S. at 598 (alteration and quotation marks 
omitted); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 
(1983) (recognizing “the common sense realization 
that government offices could not function if every 
employment decision became a constitutional matter”). 
First, “[t]he government’s interest in achieving its 
goals as effectively and efficiently as possible” 
commands greater weight, being “elevated from a 
relatively subordinate interest when it acts as 
sovereign to a significant one when it acts as 
employer.” Waters, 511 U.S. at 675 (plurality op.). 
Second, the government’s “reasonable predictions of 
disruption” are entitled to “substantial weight . . . even 
when the speech involved is on a matter of public 
concern, and even though when the government is 
acting as sovereign [the Court’s] review of legislative 
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predictions of harm is considerably less deferential.” 
Id. at 673. 
This Court has on many occasions confirmed that 
the First Amendment is not a mandate for lesser 
public efficiency. The Court has explained that when an 
individual “enters government service,” he or she 
“must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom,” 
including limitations that would be imposed in a 
private employment setting. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
These limitations may and often do restrict speech or 
associational activities that the government could not 
limit outside of the employment relationship. See, e.g., 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 141 (rejecting employee claim 
that termination for views expressed in questionnaire 
distributed to coworkers violated First Amendment); 
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 99, 101 (1947) 
(upholding provision of federal statute prohibiting 
federal employees from active participation in political 
management or political campaigns).  
Abood’s holding—that public employers may 
adopt a model of collective bargaining that utilizes 
agency fees in support of exclusive representation—is 
fully consistent with these principles and with the 
decisions in which the Court has applied them. Abood 
recognizes that the task of crafting a workable labor-
relations system is complex and difficult, and requires 
balancing numerous potentially conflicting interests 
in areas where there is widespread debate and no clear 
answer. Abood accordingly does not mandate that any 
State enact any particular labor-relations law. It 
leaves States free to devise systems based on their own 
history and particular policy choices, and it gives voters 
in each State the ultimate say over changes or amend-
ments to labor policy. See 431 U.S. at 224-25 & n.20. 
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The federal government’s recent change of heart is 
strong proof that this Court should not constitution-
alize one approach to public workforce management. 
For decades, the federal government defended Abood 
and the principle that the First Amendment affords 
States flexibility to adopt reasonable workplace 
management policies, even if federal policy was to the 
contrary. Now, the federal government has apparently 
changed its mind. But the strength of Abood—and of 
our federal system—is that it creates space for this 
kind of disagreement. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). States whose experiences show the value 
of exclusive bargaining funded by mandatory agency 
fees should not be constitutionally bound to the federal 
policy currently in vogue.  
B. Petitioner’s Challenge Is Overbroad 
Because It Encompasses Agency Fees 
for Union Services to Which He Does 
Not Object. 
Petitioner’s First Amendment challenge conflates 
an exclusive representative’s collective-bargaining 
activities—which petitioner challenges as unduly 
political—with the range of other workplace-related 
functions that an exclusive representative performs. 
Petitioner’s request for a judgment categorically 
prohibiting the collection of agency fees for any 
purpose is therefore overbroad.   
This Court recognized in Abood that requiring 
public employees to pay agency fees to cover the costs 
of an exclusive representative’s services could impact 
employees’ First Amendment rights. See 431 U.S. at 
222. And the Court made clear that government’s 
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interest as an employer justified this First Amend-
ment injury only so long as those fees were not used 
for “ideological causes not germane to [the exclusive 
representative’s] duties as collective-bargaining repre-
sentative.” Id. at 235; see also Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty 
Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991). Petitioner seeks in 
effect to revisit that balancing. Thus, he alleges that 
he objects to the “positions that AFSCME advocates 
for in collective bargaining” (J.A. 87) and argues that 
“bargaining with the government is political speech,” 
Pet. Br. 10-11. Petitioner’s amici adopt this line of 
attack, arguing that an exclusive representative’s 
collective-bargaining activity “necessarily implicates 
matters of public policy.” Br. for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Pet. 15.  
But even if this characterization of public-sector 
collective bargaining were accurate—and it is not, see, 
e.g., AFSCME Resp. Br. 42-45—petitioner’s objection 
to funding his exclusive representative’s collective-
bargaining activities would not justify his request for 
a ruling that, as a matter of law, “public employees 
cannot be forced to pay any union fees whatsoever,” 
Pet. Br. 61. As discussed above (supra Point I.B) an 
exclusive representative does more than collectively 
bargain on behalf of workers; the union can provide a 
range of services in the workplace that help to 
minimize labor unrest and promote stability in the 
workforce. Thus, even if petitioner can prove on remand 
the allegation that his exclusive representative’s 
collective-bargaining activities are unduly political, 
that would say nothing about the permissibility of 
collecting agency fees to cover other expenses of his 
exclusive representative, which petitioner does not 
label “political speech.” See Abood, 431 U.S. at 236 
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(political nature of non-chargeable expenses is a fact 
issue); see also Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 513. 
Petitioner contends that adjusting grievances “is 
just as political an act as bargaining for that deal.” 
Pet. Br. 14. But petitioner’s complaint does not frame 
an objection to—or even mention—his exclusive 
representative’s grievance-resolution activities. (E.g., 
J.A. 87.) And petitioner’s brief does not make a serious 
effort to substantiate his conclusion that the range of 
activities encompassed by “grievance-adjustment” 
constitute speech on matters of public concern. See 
Abood, 431 U.S. at 232. Nor is that conclusion self-
evident. There is simply no conceivable speech object-
ion, for instance, to a union’s receipt and investigation 
of a workplace-related complaint—steps taken long 
before the union even adopts a substantive position on 
the merits of a grievance. And this is true both for the 
vast majority of grievances, which implicate only the 
rights of the grievant, as well as for grievances with a 
potentially broader impact. What is more, grievance 
adjustment is only aspect of the non-collective-
bargaining services that an exclusive representative 
provides. Petitioner does not articulate, either in his 
complaint or his brief in this Court, any First 
Amendment objection to paying for an exclusive 
representative’s informal daily services—for instance, 
advising workers about dental benefits or inquiring 
with management about incorrect leave accruals for 
another coworker.  
A public employer could conclude that these 
services, and the agency fees that support them, are 
necessary to meet the needs of its workforce and to 
ensure uninterrupted provision of public services. 
This Court should respect those judgments and 
preserve governments’ flexibility to adopt labor-
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management policies tailored to the unique circum-
stances confronting their workforces, as this Court did 
before in Abood.   
CONCLUSION 
This Court should decline to overrule Abood. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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